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The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program is the only federal means-tested 
cash safety net program for poor families with 
children.1 TANF was created in 1996 to replace 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), in effect for 60 years.2 Its passage was 
part of the sweeping Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, designed 
to improve the lives of low-income families.
During its 15-year history, TANF has oper-
ated in good and bad economic times. What have 
we learned since its passage? Has the caseload 
changed substantially? Has the program increased 
family self-sufficiency? Do we know how to move 
families into jobs and how to provide critical train-
ing and education for disadvantaged parents? How 
does the program work within the larger safety 
net? What do we know about family outcomes 
associated with TANF? What don’t we know?
This brief draws primarily from a set of 
research briefs that address these questions 
(box 1).3 The briefs extract lessons for state 
and federal policymakers from the best avail-
able research. This synthesis, augmented by the 
research briefs, provides the required background 
for those interested in the program, as well as 
ideas for how to strengthen it.
What Is in the TANF Legislation?
Most elements of the original TANF legislation 
remain in place today. The program was  
reauthorized only once through the 2005 
Deficit Reconciliation Act (DRA), and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) enacted emergency funds to shore up 
states’ programs during the Great Recession.
The key provisions of TANF include giving 
states primary responsibility for TANF design 
within broad federal requirements (table 1). 
Federal rules require states to meet work partici-
pation rates (or face financial penalties), prohibit 
using federal dollars to fund a family’s cash assis-
tance for more than five years (with some excep-
tions), and provide federal block grant funding  
fixed in 1996 with a maintenance of effort (MOE) 
requirement for states. Elimination of federal 
eligibility for documented immigrants in the 
United States less than five years was a funda-
mental part of the legislation.
The TANF reauthorization strengthened the 
original work requirements by more narrowly 
defining allowable work activities and specifying 
the number of hours that could be spent in each 
activity. While the new requirements restricted 
states’ flexibility by defining the types of activi-
ties and the hours certain activities can count, 
the final federal rules helped states meet their 
new obligations by allowing them to count hours 
rather than days of participation and expanding 
the types of assistance credited toward MOE 
requirements. The DRA also required states to 
apply work participation requirements to more 
of their caseloads, and it updated the basis for 
credits that can reduce states’ required work  
participation rates.
The ARRA provided $5 billion in emergency  
federal funding for states with a 20 percent match 
requirement. Funds could be used for cash benefits, 
emergency assistance, subsidized jobs programs, or 
supports to help families find work. ARRA also 
modified the basis for calculating caseload reduc-
tion credits, temporarily ameliorating states’ work 
participation requirements.
State program rules vary considerably within 
broad federal rules, leading to extreme variation 
in the size and make-up of caseloads across the 
country. Generally state TANF programs can be 
Of the 9.7 million 
uninsured parents 
in the United States, 
as many as 3.5 mil-
lion living below 
the     federal poverty 
level could read-
ily be made eligible 
for Medicaid under 
 current law.
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states: 30 percent of the national TANF caseload 
lives in California.
TANF program rules, the economy, and 
other safety net programs affect caseloads. Studies 
document that declining unemployment and the 
strong economy in the late 1990s contributed to 
the post-TANF caseload decline. TANF policy 
explained roughly 20 percent of the decline. 
Changes in other policies, primarily expansion of 
the earned income tax credit (EITC), also reduced 
case loads. While there has been little rigorous 
study of caseload trends during the most recent 
recession, most experts believe that TANF is less 
responsive to an economic downturn than its 
predecessor.
Research also shows that specific TANF poli-
cies can significantly affect caseloads. In fact, most 
TANF changes have tended to reduce caseloads, 
including declining real benefits, mandated work 
activities, and diversion policies that require sub-
stantial evidence of job search or offer a one-time 
payment in lieu of enrollment. Sanctions either 
eliminate a case or create a child-only TANF unit. 
Time limits reduce caseloads, although so far only 
modestly, since most do not stay on long enough 
to reach the limit. On the other hand, policies that 
allow TANF recipients to retain more of their earn-
ings and still receive a benefit increase caseloads.
The caseload decline reflects both an increase 
in the number of families leaving welfare (exits) 
and a decrease in the number entering (entrants). 
Studies show that declining TANF entries play 
an important role in caseload decline, although 
characterized by shrinking real benefits, strate-
gies that divert families from enrolling, sanctions 
that penalize families for failing to meet program 
requirements, and benefit time limits. For exam-
ple, 30 states paid maximum TANF benefits at 
less than 30 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL) in 2008, compared to 17 states in 1996.4 
Only one state’s benefit exceeded 50 percent of 
the FPL in 2008, compared with 10 states in 
1996. Diversion strategies, not part of the pre-
TANF entitlement program, were used in  
42 states in 2008 to provide short-term assistance 
or simply discourage enrollment. States also use 
sanctions amply. For example, 22 states now 
impose full family sanctions (elimination of the 
entire benefit) the first time a family fails to meet 
program requirements. Such a sanction was not 
allowed in the AFDC program.
How Has the Caseload Changed?
Caseloads have declined dramatically since passage 
of TANF (figure 1). The steepest decline occurred 
shortly after passage of TANF during a period of 
strong economic growth. In her TANF research 
brief, Pamela Loprest explains that caseloads 
have increased somewhat following the 2007 
recession, although the number of families receiv-
ing assistance remains below prerecession levels. 
Caseload trends have varied across the states; 
some declined more than 80 percent between 
1997 and 2010 and others, only 25 percent. As 
a result, the caseload is concentrated in a few 
1.  “tanF recipients with barriers to employment,” Dan Bloom, Pamela Loprest, and Sheila Zedlewski.
2.  “Disconnected Families and tanF,” Pamela J. Loprest.
3.  “tanF Child-Only Cases,” Olivia Golden and Amelia Hawkins.
4.  “tanF and the broader safety net,” Sheila Zedlewski.
5.  “tanF Work requirements and state strategies to Fulfill them,” Heather Hahn, David Kassabian, and 
Sheila Zedlewski.
6.  “Improving employment and earnings for tanF recipients,” Gayle Hamilton.
7.  “Facilitating Postsecondary education and training for tanF recipients,” Gayle Hamilton and Susan 
Scrivener.
8.  “the tanF Caseload,” Pamela J. Loprest.
these briefs were funded through a contract from the U.s. Department of Health and Human services, the 
Office of Planning, research and evaluation of the administration for Children and Families, and can also 
be found on their web site.
BOX 1.  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program—Research Synthesis Brief Series
All briefs are available at http://www.urban.org/welfare/TANF.cfm.
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of adults on welfare in 2009 had been on for four 
years or more. We know little about how many 
not currently on TANF have accumulated years 
toward their time limits. We also know little 
about rates of return to welfare. Some evidence 
shows that returns declined somewhat between 
1997 and 2002 after a two-year period of exiting, 
but we don’t know whether this has continued 
during a weaker economy.
increasing exits explain most of the decline in 
the program’s early years. TANF “take-up” rates, 
defined as the share of eligible families that 
enroll, have declined from 79 percent in 1996 to 
36 percent in 2007 (the latest data available).
Similar to patterns found in studies of AFDC, 
the time spent on welfare remains fairly short for 
most families with adult recipients. For example, 
administrative data indicate that only 12 percent 
Table 1.  The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Federal Legislation
 Legislation Purposes Key provisions
Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, establishing 
TANF through 2002
Provide assistance so children 
could be cared for in own 
homes or homes of relatives.
End parental dependence on 
government benefits by pro-
moting job preparation, work, 
and marriage.
Discourage pregnancies outside 
of marriage.
Encourage formation and mainte-
nance of two-parent families.
Give states primary respon-
sibility for program design.
Set state work participation 
rates within 12 categories 
of activities. Set minimum 
hours/week to count as 
participating.
Award caseload reduction 
credit allowing states to 
reduce requirement by 
% of caseload reduction 
since 1995.
Set time limits on federal 
benefits.
Fund fixed block grants and 
require state maintenance 
of effort (MOE).
Grant bonuses for reducing 
illegitimacy, achieving 
high performance.
Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, extending TANF 
through fiscal 2010
Strengthen work requirements.
Increase family self-sufficiency.
Improve reliability of work par-
ticipation data and program 
integrity.
Define 12 work activities.
Define methods for report-
ing and verifying work.
Include all families in work 
participation requirement.
Change the caseload reduc-
tion credit by moving base 
year to 2005 from 1995.
Broaden expenditures that 
count toward MOE.
Eliminate bonuses and 
establish grants for 
healthy marriage.
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 
effective through fiscal 
2010
Emergency funding for state 
TANF programs in response to 
recession beginning in 2007.
Award $5 billion with state 
20% match required.
Increase TANF assistance.
Increase short-term benefits.
Subsidize employment.
Sources: Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, (1996); Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-115, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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studies have documented that one-third to one-
half of these cases involved child protective ser-
vices to some degree. Studies have also suggested 
particular concerns about these children’s well-
being. Federal and state policies affect how these 
TANF cases form by whether local agencies seek 
kin to care for maltreated children and whether 
kin can be licensed as foster parents who receive 
caregiver subsidies as permanent guardians or 
adoptive parents. These subsidies would typically 
make them ineligible for TANF.
Child-only units created through parent 
ineligibility present different questions. Children 
born in the United States to undocumented 
immigrants are automatically citizens and eli-
gible for TANF if their parents’ resources are low 
enough to qualify. (Some states also fund ben-
efits to the parents.) In most states, parents who 
receive SSI disability payments are not themselves 
eligible for TANF (because the SSI benefit is too 
high), but their children may be. And states that 
sanction parents but not their children for some  
or all rule violations create child-only units. Unlike 
parents in other child-only cases, sanctioned par-
ents may count as work eligible and be included 
in states’ work participation calculations.6
Characteristics of Parents Receiving TANF
The characteristics of adults receiving welfare have 
changed little since passage of TANF. Pamela 
Loprest reports that some state-specific studies 
Child-Only TANF Cases
As shown in figure 1, in 2009 child-only cases, 
those without a parent eligible for benefits, make 
up about half of the TANF caseload, compared 
with about one in five just prior to TANF imple-
mentation in 1996. Only 800,000 adults received 
TANF cash assistance in 2009. Two-parent fami-
lies remain a small share of the caseload—5 per-
cent in 2009 compared with 8 percent in 1996. 
While the large increase in child-only cases can be 
attributed to declining numbers of parent families 
on TANF, it is critical to understand that in half of 
TANF cases only the children receive benefits.
Olivia Golden and Amelia Hawkins explain 
that child-only cases have generated little research 
given their importance to TANF. About 4 in 10  
of these families do not include a parent, and 
two-thirds of children in nonparental cases live 
with a grandparent. The 6 in 10 child-only TANF  
families with parents present include parents 
ineligible due to citizenship rules (42 percent), par-
ents receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
benefits and therefore ineligible (34 percent), and 
sanctioned parents (10 percent).5 The child-only 
shares of cases and the share in each subcategory 
vary widely across states. Some variations can be 
explained by state policy or demographic charac-
teristics, but no systematic analysis exists.
Golden and Hawkins describe important 
connections between nonparental child-only 
units and the child welfare system. State-specific 
FigUre 1.  TANF Caseload and Composition: Millions of Families, Selected Years
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Source: Table 3, Characteristics of TANF Active Cases, Various Years. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/. 
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application requires extensive documentation of 
disabilities and, sometimes, multiple hearings. 
States may connect recipients to legal services 
or other providers to help them through the 
process. A few TANF programs have their own 
medical assessments that mimic those used by SSI 
to ensure applicants have a high probability of 
eligibility. States typically exempt TANF recipi-
ents applying for SSI from work activities, which 
could jeopardize their approval. However, federal 
rules count SSI applicants in states’ work partici-
pation rate calculations. Some states move SSI 
applicants into separate state-funded programs so 
they do not count in the participation rate, and 
so the applicant’s waiting time does not count 
against the TANF time limit.
How Do States Meet the Work 
Participation Requirements?
In most states, work is TANF’s primary focus. 
Heather Hahn, David Kassabian, and Sheila 
Zedlewski describe how most states have met the 
DRA requirements, despite the weakening econ-
omy. States adopted multiple strategies, such as 
creating more unpaid work opportunities, keep-
ing working families in the caseload longer, and 
moving some families into solely state-funded 
programs (SSFs) outside of TANF.
Since its inception, TANF has required states 
to engage at least half of all TANF families with a 
work-eligible individual and at least 90 percent of 
two-parent TANF families with two work-eligible 
individuals in work or work activities. Nearly 
all TANF adult recipients are classified as work 
eligible.7 While states can exclude certain groups 
from these requirements, federal regulations 
require states count all work-eligible adults in the 
participation rate.
With a couple of exceptions, work-eligible 
TANF recipients must participate in work activi-
ties for at least 30 hours a week, including at least 
20 hours in a “core” activity (including employ-
ment) and the remaining hours in core or “non-
core” activities (such as education). Single parents 
with children under age 6 must participate for 
a total of 20 hours per week, and teen parents 
count as participating as long as they are attend-
ing school. The DRA carefully defines allowable 
core and noncore activities and in some cases 
limits the amount of each activity that can count. 
Post-DRA regulations allow states to count hourly 
equivalents toward these requirements. Many 
states had to set up new systems for reporting and 
verifying hours of participation to meet the new 
requirements.
find evidence of increases in health problems, and 
administrative data show small increases in the 
Hispanic and Native American shares of recipi-
ents. The share of noncitizen cases has declined.
When TANF first passed, many hypoth-
esized that parents in the program would become 
an increasingly hard-to-employ group as the more 
work-ready recipients moved into jobs. Yet, the 
share of the TANF adult caseload with barriers to 
employment has remained fairly constant.
Dan Bloom, Pamela Loprest, and Sheila 
Zedlewski report that, generally, studies find 
most adults receiving TANF have at least one 
barrier to employment, including low educa-
tion, limited work experience, mental or physical 
health challenges, and caregiving responsibilities 
for special needs children. Nationally representa-
tive and state-specific studies generally find that 
about 4 in 10 adults on TANF have multiple 
barriers. Most barriers are associated with lower 
employment, and the likelihood of work declines 
as the number of barriers increases.
Programs that identify and serve TANF 
recipients with barriers to employment are com-
plex. States often provide a range of services apart 
from work supports, including intensive case 
management, rehabilitative services, job coach-
ing, support groups, and referrals. Many create 
individual plans geared to overcoming multiple, 
varied challenges.
The literature shows that some services help 
move these recipients to work. Interventions 
that have been tested and rigorously evaluated 
fall along a continuum of service strategies, from 
models focused on work experience to those 
focused on treatment. Evaluations of eight post-
TANF interventions conclude that most achieved 
at least some positive impacts. For example, pro-
grams focused on employment that include a mix 
of job preparation and work experience show 
small increases in employment, sometimes last-
ing for several years. Programs focused primarily 
on treatment succeed in their immediate goal 
of increasing participation in substance abuse 
or mental health services. However, increases in 
treatment participation do not typically translate 
into better health or employment outcomes. 
Some evidence suggests that expensive, intensive 
case management models that include small 
caseloads and a home visiting component hold 
promise.
As part of states’ strategies for serving the 
hard-to-employ, many help TANF recipients 
apply for SSI, the federal program for low-income 
persons with disabilities severe enough to pre-
vent work. The complex, time-consuming SSI 
An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies
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can increase work and earnings compared with 
having no program, even after five years. But 
mandatory job search gets people into jobs 
sooner, and education-first strategies do not 
ultimately increase likelihood of holding a good 
job or even more jobs. Mixed strategies that 
combine high-quality program services (such as 
training, case management, and support services) 
delivered by community colleges with a strong 
employment focus work best. The literature 
shows a clear role for skills enhancement, partic-
ularly when credentials are earned, but job seek-
ing and work along with education and training 
are important.
Other research examines the effectiveness 
of subsidized work models that use public funds 
to create or support temporary work opportuni-
ties. These experiments have typically targeted 
very disadvantaged individuals. The results sug-
gest these programs have boosted employment 
in the short run but rarely in the longer term. 
Transitional jobs programs—defined as providing 
a temporary, wage-paying job with support ser-
vices and some case management—may also cre-
ate useful work opportunities and reduce welfare 
receipt. However, the one available rigorously-
evaluated program did not improve longer-term 
unsubsidized employment or earnings.
Other interventions focus on sectoral training 
initiatives that connect employment programs 
to specific businesses and industries through 
integrated skills training. One study that rigor-
ously tested the effects of such training for low-
income individuals (all of whom had completed 
high school or GED) showed promise based on 
increased employment and earnings in a two-year 
follow-up period.
Many studies show that supplementing 
low-wage workers’ earnings can promote employ-
ment, and longer-lasting effects may be attain-
able. Effects are larger when these incentives are 
combined with job search services. These studies 
also show that wage supplements can affect work 
hours since individuals can work less and still 
maintain income, suggesting an important trade-
off in designing incentives.
Other initiatives seek to increase job reten-
tion. Current and former TANF recipients have 
trouble maintaining employment and consistently 
earning wages. Programs such as job search assis-
tance after a job loss, job coaching, and assistance 
in accessing work supports such as food stamps 
and child care may increase employment reten-
tion and earnings. Evaluation results have been 
mixed. Numerous programs have lacked proven 
impacts, but others showed success. Financial 
incentives for employment retention along with 
Caseload reduction credits can lower the 
required participation rates. Credits can be earned 
either by reducing the TANF caseload relative 
to a base year or by contributing more than the 
required MOE on TANF-related activities. The 
DRA changed the base year from 1995 to 2005, 
substantially reducing this avenue for achieving 
credits since most of the TANF caseload declined 
in the years just after TANF passed. However, 
excess MOE credits have increased. A state can 
deduct from its participation requirement the 
number of cases that could be funded with excess 
MOE dollars.8 This has allowed many states to 
earn enough credits to meet their work participa-
tion rates. Just prior to the DRA, 17 states met 
their rates through caseload reduction credits 
alone, compared with 21 states in 2009.
States employ numerous strategies to achieve 
these work participation rates. Most states count 
a combination of job-related education and train-
ing and employment activities. Creative strategies 
include keeping working families in the caseload 
and removing nonworking families. More gener-
ous earned income disregards or small monthly 
supplements for families with earnings high 
enough to otherwise disqualify them increase 
the share of the adult caseload with earnings. 
Full family sanctions cut nonworking families 
from the caseload. Moving hard-to-employ and 
two-parent families into SSFs also reduces the 
nonworking part of the caseload. Diversion strat-
egies that offer a short-term cash payment in lieu 
of enrollment or that require substantial proof of 
employment search before enrollment also keep 
nonworking adults off the caseloads.
The national all-families’ work participa-
tion rate has ranged between 31 and 35 percent 
for most of TANF history.9 Individual states’ 
all-families rates ranged from 10 to 68 percent in 
2009. Yet, most states were able to meet the fed-
eral requirements by combining these work par-
ticipation rates with caseload reduction credits.10
What Employment and 
Education Programs Increase  
Self Sufficiency?
Policymakers often want to know what strategies 
would help TANF parents or those with similar 
characteristics move into employment and long-
term self-sufficiency. Gayle Hamilton synthesizes 
a large body of evidence evaluating such strate-
gies, and Gayle Hamilton and Susan Scrivener 
describe the effectiveness of initiatives to increase 
post secondary education and training.
Employment models. Rigorous research shows 
that both work-first and education-first strategies  
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promise. Low-income parents in such programs 
were more likely to attend college full time, earn 
better grades, and earn more credits. They also 
registered for college at higher rates.
What Other Services Does  
TANF Provide?
All discussions about hard-to-employ TANF 
recipients, work participation rates, and initia-
tives to increase employment or education miss 
a large part of the TANF program. In fiscal year 
2009, states spent 73 percent of TANF funds 
(federal and state MOE) for purposes other than 
cash assistance, compared with 30 percent in fis-
cal year 1997 (U.S. GAO 2011, 8). This “non-
assistance” includes spending that furthers TANF 
goals, such as child care, transportation, refund-
able tax credits, short-term assistance (including 
diversion payments), and employment programs. 
Some spending directly helps current and for-
mer TANF cash assistance recipients and some 
is directed to a broader population that never 
received TANF.
A large share of states’ nonassistance spend-
ing (about 30 percent in 2009) gets categorized 
as “other” on federal reporting forms, and states 
were required to provide additional detail on this 
spending in 2011 (U.S. DHHS 2011). The early 
results indicate that most goes toward child wel-
fare payments and services (25 percent). Other 
spending is divided across a wide range of activi-
ties, including emergency assistance, domestic vio-
lence, and mental health and addiction services.
Many low-income families served through 
the TANF block grant are not reflected in the 
caseload counts. There is a wide range of non-
assistance spending across states: California spent  
62 percent of expenditures on assistance for TANF 
recipients (including cash payments, child care, 
and transportation), compared with only 20 per-
cent in Wisconsin.
How Does TANF Fit with the 
Broader Safety Net?
Sheila Zedlewski shows how TANF often serves 
as a portal to other safety net benefits for low-
income families with children. Families that 
enroll in TANF typically get enrolled in the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) and Medicaid automatically, and work-
ing recipients receive child care subsidies. Most 
families receive these benefits when they transi-
tion off TANF, although rules vary across the 
states. As noted, TANF programs may help those 
with significant disabilities apply for SSI.
job coaching, and close ties between providers or 
staff and employers seem to work best.
Education models. Whether TANF should 
promote increased education, particularly post-
secondary education, to help recipients to reach 
self-sufficiency is a long-standing debate. As 
noted above, the DRA limited how much educa-
tion can be counted as a work activity, consistent 
with results showing that education before job 
placement does not work better than job place-
ment alone. DRA limited vocational training to 
12 months for a given recipient, and training and 
education directly related to employment can 
only count when combined with 20 hours in a 
core work activity.
Arguments for increasing education derive 
from evidence showing more education leads 
to higher earnings. Over the last 25 years wages 
have increased for those with college or more, 
wages for high school graduates have remained 
stagnant, and wages for high school dropouts 
have fallen. People with an associate’s degree or 
who completed a certificate program earn more 
than those with only a high school diploma or 
GED. Since only one-third of low-income work-
ers with children have more than a high school 
diploma and one-third are high school dropouts, 
many seek to increase education among this 
population.
Gayle Hamilton and Susan Scrivener con-
clude that the evaluations of models focused on 
increasing postsecondary education for low-wage 
workers contradict the broader evidence that more 
education increases earnings. Initiatives that aim 
to increase postsecondary education and train-
ing typically test whether training occurs and 
whether the increased education increases earn-
ings. Results for recent models that target TANF 
recipients by combining referrals to community 
college or training with at least 20 hours a week 
of paid work are not encouraging. For individuals 
with a high school diploma or equivalent, add-
ing education to mandated work when compared 
with a typical work-first program had little or no 
effect on participation in education or training 
or completion of certificates or diplomas. On the 
other hand, sector-based training models that tar-
get individuals with specific aptitudes for specific 
occupations (such as health care or information 
technology) and assist with job matching did 
increase those who began and completed train-
ing. Sector-based training programs also increased 
earnings, although gains were generally modest.
Other programs aim to help those already 
enrolled in community college stay in school. 
Performance-based scholarship programs that pay 
students if they meet academic benchmarks hold 
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Studies show that low-income families rarely 
receive all of the safety net benefits for which they 
are eligible. Complex program rules and inter-
actions often make it difficult to learn about eli-
gibility and access services, and participation rates 
vary across programs. Studies documenting post-
TANF coordination of benefits show that some 
states use several structures such as colocation 
of services, but service delivery in most states is 
uneven. Studies document that the complexity of 
forms and regulations, hassles and hurdles to get 
on and stay on the rolls, and unfriendly offices all 
contribute to low participation.
How Have Families  
Been Affected?
Most research on the effect of TANF on family 
and child outcomes concludes it has had few 
measureable effects. A 2009 book edited by James 
Ziliak summarizes these findings: Rebecca Blank’s 
chapter outlines what we know about work and 
welfare participation (see above in the discussion 
of caseload decline), health and health insurance, 
child outcomes and child care usage, and family 
composition and fertility. One caveat is that most 
reviewed studies reflect only data through 2000 
and 2002; in two cases, data carry through 2004.
Blank’s review of the evidence concludes that 
welfare reform reduced health insurance coverage, 
but the effects on single women were quite small. 
Also, any evidence of the impact of insurance 
changes on health outcomes is limited.
Blank also concludes that children’s outcomes 
do not appear to be significantly affected by wel-
fare reform. Some evidence suggests that young 
children do slightly better if child care subsidies 
allow newly working parents to place children 
in formal child care settings. One motivation of 
welfare reform was the hope that moving moth-
ers into work would increase children’s aware-
ness of the value of education and the need to 
prepare for work, but little evidence supports or 
refutes these claims. Evidence of any effects of 
welfare reform on marriage is also quite weak. 
Cohabitation has increased, but this is likely 
because single mothers have more need to share 
incomes. Research continues to show minor 
effects of welfare reform on fertility.
More recent attention has focused on dis-
connected families, a potentially negative effect 
of welfare reform. As Pamela Loprest explains, 
many pointed to caseload declines and increases 
in working single parents as evidence of TANF’s 
success. Yet national and state studies also began 
to note that a significant minority of former 
TANF itself represents a relatively small part 
of the safety net. Medicaid, SSI, SNAP, and the 
federal EITC expenditures (even considering 
only the portion focused on families with chil-
dren), far exceed spending on TANF. In 2009, 
81 percent of TANF families also received SNAP, 
98 percent received Medicaid, and 16 percent 
received SSI. Nonetheless, TANF families com-
prise relatively small shares of these programs. 
They make up about 19 percent of all SNAP 
households with children and 14 percent of the 
SSI awards to nonelderly individuals.
Other important parts of the safety net 
for TANF families include child care subsidies, 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) services, and 
child support enforcement. TANF parents who 
work are guaranteed subsidies for child care; 
other low-income parents not on TANF may also 
qualify. Rules vary tremendously across states. The 
latest administrative data indicate that 9 percent 
of all TANF cases receive child care subsidies. 
(Since only half of TANF cases have a work- 
eligible adult and about 30 percent of them 
engage in work activities, the share requiring 
child care is relatively small.)
WIA provides employment services (job 
search and preparation, training and education) 
that are typically available to low-income indi-
viduals outside of TANF. Some states have strong 
connections between their TANF and WIA 
programs to create a more streamlined employ-
ment support system, while others simply refer 
TANF clients to WIA agencies. In general, few 
low-income workers receive WIA employment 
services owing to limited and declining funds  
($3 billion in 2009).
The Office of Child Support Enforcement 
funds programs to locate parents, establish 
paternity and support orders, and collect sup-
port payments. These services are available  
automatically for families receiving TANF assis-
tance and for other families upon request. The 
program distributed $26 billion in child support 
payments in 2009, an important source of sup-
port for custodial parents. In 2009, 14 percent 
of TANF parents received some child support 
income.
A small share of unemployed TANF parents 
receives Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. 
When TANF first passed, many hoped that more 
low-income parents with children would qualify 
for benefits as they gained more work experience. 
UI benefits would then reduce the need for cash 
welfare benefits. While the share of unemployed 
single parents receiving UI benefits has increased, 
it is still only 30 percent (Nichols and Zedlewski 
2011).
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2. TANF programs usually focus on moving par-
ents who receive benefits into employment.
n Federal regulations require states to meet 
work participation rates of 50 percent 
for all families. States employ numerous 
strategies to count adult recipients in 
work activities, including incentives that 
allow parents to keep some TANF benefit 
when working and penalties that remove 
nonparticipating families from the case-
load. States, on average, only reach a 
30 percent work participation rate. The 
remainder of the requirement is met 
through credits earned through caseload 
decline and monies spent on services for 
low-income families in excess of states’ 
MOE requirement.
n About 8 in 10 parents on TANF have at 
least one barrier to employment, and 4 
in 10 have multiple barriers (poor mental 
or physical health, lack of a high school 
diploma, limited work experience, or care 
of a disabled family member). States often 
have specialized services for the hardest to 
employ, although effective solutions seem 
illusive.
3. Strong evidence is scarce on strategies that 
move families to self-sufficiency.
n Rigorously evaluated programs to increase 
employment or education among TANF 
recipients or similar populations have not 
held much promise, especially in terms 
of long-term employment or earnings 
increases.
n Evaluations of both types of interventions 
suggest that models combining work with 
skills training and targeting specific indus-
try needs work best.
4. TANF serves as a portal for access to other 
safety net programs.
n While TANF families do not make up 
large shares of other safety net programs, 
they do tend to receive other benefits, 
especially SNAP and Medicaid, to aug-
ment TANF.
n Despite increased labor market experience 
among single mothers over the last decade, 
few qualify for UI.
n While some studies conclude that connec-
tions across safety net programs should 
be better coordinated, TANF’s assistance 
with access to disability benefits, SNAP, 
subsidized child care, and employment and 
child support services fills a critical need 
for low-income families.
recipients did not leave welfare with employment. 
Coupled with declining TANF enrollment, con-
cerns were raised about families “disconnected” 
from the labor market and cash public assistance 
(TANF or disability benefits).
One national study estimates that one in five 
recipients who left TANF in the past two years 
were disconnected. Among all low-income single 
mothers, estimates range from 17 to 26 percent. 
While incomes are low, child support is one 
important source of income. Many also receive 
SNAP or housing assistance.
Studies also show that disconnected families 
are more disadvantaged than other low-income 
single-mother families. They have a high rate of 
barriers to work, such as physical and mental dis-
abilities. Many live with other adults (about one-
third with a cohabiter and one-third with relatives 
and friends) and one-third live alone. Studies that 
include cohabiters’ income show that these families 
typically still have incomes below poverty.
While the evidence on the length of time 
spent as a disconnected family is scant, some 
research indicates that many families move in and 
out of this state, but a substantial minority are dis-
connected for long times For example, one study 
finds 17 percent of disconnected single-mother 
families were disconnected for an entire year.
Summing Up
TANF is a very different program than its pre-
decessor that primarily paid cash benefits to very 
low income parents with children:
1. The nature of the caseload and focus of spend-
ing have changed dramatically.
n Only half the TANF caseload—about 
800,000 families—includes parents 
receiving benefits. Child-only units 
make up the rest. While 6 in 10 of these 
families include ineligible parents (due to 
receipt of disability benefits, immigration 
status, or sanctioned status), 4 in 10 do 
not. Children in these families live with 
relatives (mostly grandparents) or legal 
guardians.
n Over 7 in 10 TANF dollars pay for services 
that do not count as assistance or affect 
the caseload counts. Low-income families 
with children may receive emergency cash 
intended to divert them from enrolling, 
child care or transportation assistance, or 
even a refundable state EITC. In some 
states TANF dollars help fund child welfare 
programs.
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 3. The research briefs were developed under contract to the 
Administration for Children and Families of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.
 4. This summary of rule changes is taken from Zedlewski 
and Golden (2010).
 5. The numbers do not add to 100 percent because 14 per-
cent of these families cannot be categorized.
 6. States may disregard an adult penalized for refusal to work 
in that month, unless the adult has been penalized for 
more than 3 of the last 12 months (U.S. DHHS 2011).
 7. At state option, single parents of children under age 1 
may be excluded. Child-only families are not included.
 8. The excess MOE credit is deducted from the number of 
cases required to participate in work activities.
 9. The two-parent rate has averaged between 40 and  
50 percent.
10. In 2009, eight states failed to meet the all-families rate 
but nearly all avoided penalties by providing reasonable 
cause or submitting corrective compliance plans to HHS.
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When Congress finally tackles the next 
reauthorization of TANF (originally due in 
2010), it needs to recognize that TANF does 
not provide much regular cash assistance. 
Instead, the program lives up to its name of 
“Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.” 
Families in need are more likely to receive a 
helping hand than what many think of as a 
welfare check. The program’s nature leads to 
concerns, especially in a weak economy, about 
parents who cannot find a job or who have a 
disability and do not qualify for other income 
supports. The share of low-income single par-
ents classified as disconnected from work and 
cash assistance will likely continue to increase 
without new reforms.
We could strengthen the safety net through 
proposals to expand UI coverage for more job 
losers, offer broad support for specialized training 
connected to employer needs, subsidize jobs with 
targeted support services, and guarantee regular, 
but temporary, cash assistance for families that 
have no other income. ARRA funded subsidized 
jobs programs, and states showed they could 
quickly gear up effective programs. The DRA 
focused states’ resources on counting work activities 
rather than developing and testing programs that 
effectively move parents into jobs. TANF reauthori-
zation should learn from these experiences.
Rep. Gwen Moore (D–WI) has introduced 
the Rewriting to Improve and Secure an Exit Out 
of Poverty Act (the RISE Act) to overhaul TANF. 
The bill includes numerous improvements such 
as updating and indexing of the block grant 
funds, eliminating time limits on types of work 
participation (such as education), and eliminat-
ing full family sanctions. These proposals, along 
with other ideas based on 15 years of experience, 
should be debated to strengthen TANF and the 
safety net for vulnerable families.
Notes
 1. The other means-tested cash assistance program, 
Supplemental Security Income, serves individuals with 
serious disabilities.
 2. AFDC was created in 1935 through Title Iv of the Social 
Security Act.
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